一类非线性微分方程耦合系统无穷边值问题解的存在性

在Banach空间中，利用M?nch不动点定理，结合一个新的比较结果，研究一类一阶非线性微分方程耦合系统无穷边值问题，其非线性项和边值条件均具有耦合性。获得该问题解的存在性定理，并给出一个应用实例。     

人工智能心理学研究的知识图谱分析

借助CitespaceⅢ对选自WoS的人工智能心理学研究文献进行知识图谱探析,结合自动聚类视图与议题标签展现了人工智能心理学领域的6个知识聚类:#0人工智能解决问题议题;#1人工与人类认知共性议题;#2人工智能学习议题;#3人工智能脑科学议题;#4人工智能环境认知议题;#5人工智能表征议题。在深入探究各聚类的核心与热点知识的基础上分析了人工智能心理学发展的各阶段特征:1.上世纪50年代图灵和米勒等人对机器认知与学习等概念的猜想与初探;2.70-90年代纽厄尔、西蒙和莱尔德等人基于模块记忆与层级分析对人工智能信息处理模型的系统性构建;3.本世纪初基于神经生理学的降维数据认知理论的发展;4.当下人工智能贝叶斯大脑与深度学习理论的兴起。     

太阳系外行星的探测——2019年诺贝尔物理学奖成果简析

 James Peebles、Michel Mayor和Didier Queloz 3位科学家分享了2019年诺贝尔物理学奖，以表彰他们对宇宙学和系外行星的发现做出的贡献。介绍了Mayor和Queloz两位诺贝尔物理学奖获得者的学术经历，简述了系外行星领域的发展及现状，解读了太阳系外行星首次发现的科学意义，论述了视向速度法探测系外行星的原理和发展过程，介绍了该领域在中国的研究进展，并对未来进行了展望。     

基于三支决策的二阶段分类模型研究

当对三支决策边界域进一步划分时,边界域知识存在划分信息不足,从而导致分类精度不高,针对上述问题提出一种新的基于三支决策的二阶段分类模型(TWD-TP).第一阶段根据贝叶斯规则构建三支决策中样本的条件概率,通过求解最优化损失函数得到所需阈值,然后按照三支决策规则对数据集进行划分.三支决策是基于最小风险贝叶斯决策理论的划分,在其正域、负域中包含一定的误分类样本;在第二阶段通过类标签索引分别将正域、负域中误分样本作为增量信息引入延迟决策域,形成重构边界域,最后对重构边界域进行划分.实验结果表明:所提出的TWD-TP模型不仅能在三支决策划分中筛选出高误分类特征的样本,同时其重构边界域中不能被划分的样本得到正确划分,分类精度进一步提高.     

本科教学中逻辑性课程《纳米材料》的主线设计探索

《纳米材料》课程主要讲解纳米材料的结构与性能之间关系的概念与理论,这种定位决定了纳米材料课应采用逻辑教学法.在这种方法下需找到课程逻辑起点,然后沿着起点设计出一条课程主线,建立课程理论体系,从而合理承接培养方案中的课程群.在《纳米材料》中,纳米结构就是逻辑起点,主线就是"结构与性能"的关系.故该门课程应按"结构和性能"这条主线展开.对现行纳米材料课程内容进行分析,大部分内容均可用主线串联起来.该方法为类似的逻辑性课程教学方法改革以及在课程章节内容之间建立逻辑关联提供借鉴.     

利用探空秒数据估算北京地区日最大混合层高度

研究利用北京地区L波段探空秒数据和地面日最大位温, 采用气块法反演北京地区日最大混合层高度(MMH)的可行性。将08时探空秒数据以及常规探空数据反演结果分别与对应的微脉冲激光雷达反演结果相比较, 发现前者与激光雷达反演结果的一致性好于后者, 常规探空数据垂直空间分辨率低可能是导致其反演结果误差较大的原因。分别用春夏秋冬的探空秒数据反演结果与激光雷达反演结果相比较, 发现春夏秋反演结果的一致性较好, 而冬季较差。利用08时探空秒数据结合地面日最大位温, 采用气块法反演北京地区2010—2017年的MMH, 发现MMH 每年均表现出春夏秋冬逐次递减的分布特征。通过对长期资料的统计分析发现, 北京地区日地面最高气温与850 hPa温度差定义的热力稳定度与MMH之间存在较强的正相关性。     

计算Ulam映射高阶关联函数计算的数论方法

为计算logistic映射的高阶关联函数，本文提出了一个包含定义、引理及定理的数论方法，该方法的层次性结构有助于通过逐级求解丢番图方程来简化计算. 作为应用，本文计算了映射的前5阶关联函数. 6阶以上的关联函数也可以通过该方法直接算得.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

Edward Gresham’s Astrostereon,or A Discourse of the Falling of the Planet (1603), the Copernican paradox,and the construction of early modern proto-scientific discourse

This paper investigates the functioning of the ‘Copernican paradox’ (stating that the Sun stands still and the Earth revolves around the Sun) in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, with particular attention to Edward Gresham's (1565–1613) little-known and hitherto understudied astronomical treatise – Astrostereon, or A Discourse of the Falling of the Planet (1603). The text, which is fully appreciative of the heliocentric system, is analysed within a broader context of the ongoing struggles with the Copernican theory at the turn of the seventeenth century. The article finds that apart from having a purely rhetorical function, the ‘Copernican paradox’ featured in the epistemological debates on how early modern scientific knowledge should be constructed and popularised. The introduction of new scientific claims to sceptical audiences had to be done both through mathematical demonstrations and by referring to the familiar concepts and tools drawn from the inventory of humanist education. As this article shows, Gresham's rhetorical techniques used for the rejection of paradoxicality of heliocentrism are similar to some of the practices which Thomas Digges and William Gilbert employed in order to defend their own findings and assertions.